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  It has been hypothesized that differentially applied environmental regulations create pollution 
havens, as firms will choose to invest in countries with lax environmental standards. Using a 
theoretical model of pest control adoption and an empirical spatial equilibrium model, we ex-
amine one such environmental regulation, a U.S. ban on methyl bromide, to determine if an 
agricultural pollution haven will be created in Mexico. Alterations in agricultural production 
location, trade patterns, and methyl bromide use are determined. We find that, under the as-
sumptions held, Mexico will not dramatically increase its use of methyl bromide following the 
ban. Sensitivity analysis to this result is conducted. 
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The ongoing debate surrounding most multilateral 
trade agreements revolves around the potential 
for conflict between environmental protection and 
trade liberalization. Environmentalists see trade 
liberalization and trade agreements as leading to 
less stringent environmental standards and more 
difficulty in achieving new environmental regula-
tions, as domestic producers will demand a level 
playing field. Proponents of trade liberalization, 
on the other hand, claim that policies to protect 
the environment are disguised trade barriers. 
  In recent articles on trade and the environment, 
researchers have focused on how trade agree-
ments and trade mechanisms affect the environ-
ment by either increasing production, shifting 
production sites, or eliminating production, with 
many researchers estimating environmental 
Kuznets curves (see Dean 1992, Nordstrom and 
Vaughan 1999, and Copeland and Taylor 2003 
for surveys of this literature). In addition, atten-
tion has been given to how trade instruments, 
such as a ban on exports or imports, can be used 
to achieve a reduction in pollution. Other papers 
have examined how environmental regulations 
affect trade patterns and firm locations (see Dean 
1992, Nordstrom and Vaughan 1999, Copeland 
and Taylor 2003). Several authors have investi-
gated whether trade liberalization is creating pol-
lution havens or a “race to the bottom,” where 
countries lower (or do not raise) their environ-
mental regulations to attract foreign direct in-
vestment. Environmental regulations may or may 
not achieve their intended goal, or may do so in a 
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way that distorts resource allocation and imposes 
large welfare losses (Sullivan 1994). 
  Our research examines how differentially ap-
plied environmental regulations can impact agri-
cultural trade patterns and production location. 
We develop a model to predict and test whether 
an agricultural pollution haven effect is found 
with respect to Mexico following the U.S.’s 
phaseout of methyl bromide. To do this, we incor-
porate cost, yield, and pest pressure differences 
due to geographic and climatic differences by 
region or country into the empirical study. Dean, 
Lovely, and Wang (2005) find that production 
differences due to different levels of access to 
technology may affect the impact of the environ-
mental regulations—for example, identical regu-
lations may impact less technologically advanced 
countries’ investment more. Thus, heterogeneity 
beyond regulatory differences can have important 
implications in the degree to which the stringency 
of environmental regulations determines produc-
tion location. In our model, the heterogeneity 
derives not from differential access to technology 
but to climatic differences and varying levels of 
pest pressure that result in varying demands for 
pest control. The pest control in question, methyl 
bromide, depletes the ozone layer—i.e., it is a 
global rather than local pollutant. We can 
examine whether, if regulations are imposed in 
one country to restrict the use of an environmen-
tally damaging pest control, affected growers 
relocate production to another country or region 
with less strict regulations or with less pest 
pressure. Changes in technology use and crop-
ping patterns as a result of a unilateral (i.e., single 
region’s) change in an environmental regulation 
are examined. 
  While previous studies have examined the im-
pact of a unilateral ban on methyl bromide (USDA 
1993, Ferguson and Padula 1994, Sunding et al. 
1993, Yarkin et al. 1994, Deepak, Spreen, and 
VanSickle 1994, Deepak, Spreen, and VanSickle 
1996, Lynch 1996, Carpenter, Gianessi, and Lynch 
2000), only Lynch (1996) included the possibility 
that Mexican growers would increase their use of 
methyl bromide following the ban’s implementa-
tion and thereby dilute the environmental objec-
tive of the policy. This research extends Lynch’s 
work, developing a theoretical model and incor-
porating more crops and regions into the empiri-
cal analysis. 
  Three possible outcomes of unilateral environ-
mental regulation exist: (i) production shifts to 
the foreign country without regulation, increasing 
global use of methyl bromide use; domestic 
prices increase; foreign production increases; and 
domestic production decreases; (ii) production 
shifts to the foreign country, but the foreign coun-
try does not adopt methyl bromide, so global use 
decreases, domestic prices increase, foreign pro-
duction increases, and domestic production de-
creases; and (iii) production does not shift to a 
foreign country, domestic production decreases, 
and domestic prices increase. Under scenario (i), 
global use of the chemical increases and large 
costs are imposed on domestic producers. Under 
scenarios (ii) and (iii), global use decreases, but 
the costs to domestic producers will vary, with 





Methyl bromide emissions contribute to ozone 
loss. The ozone layer protects the earth from the 
damaging effects of ultraviolet (UV) radiation 
from the sun. UV is responsible for “normal” skin 
changes, such as sunburn and tanning, and “ab-
normal” changes such as skin cancer. It is esti-
mated that for every one percent decrease in 
stratospheric ozone, the incidence of malignant 
melanoma skin cancer will increase 0.6 percent, 
non-melanoma skin cancer 3 percent, and cata-
racts 1.2 percent (Urbach 1990). Fifteen to 35 
percent of the total amount of methyl bromide 
entering the atmosphere is from human agricul-
tural activities. One of the major human uses is 
soil fumigation for horticulture crops. The per-
centage of total applied methyl bromide that emits 
into the atmosphere from soil treatments ranges 
from 30–85 percent. 
  The U.S. Clean Air Act requires the phaseout of 
any substance with an ozone depletion level (ODP) 
of 0.2 or higher. When the Montreal Protocol par-
ties listed methyl bromide with an ODP of 0.7 (re-
vised to 0.6) in 1992, the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) instituted a unilateral ban on 
the production and importation of methyl bromide 
after January 1, 2001. However, none of the parties 
to the Montreal Protocol had  agreed, as of 1992, to 
a phaseout schedule. For a 5-year period, no regu-
lation on use in Mexico existed. 
 April 2005  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review  56 
 
  The parties to the Montreal Protocol adopted a 
phaseout schedule in 1997. The U.S. Congress 
amended the Clean Air Act to harmonize the U.S. 
schedule with the Protocol’s, requiring a 100 per-
cent reduction in production and importation by 
2005. The Protocol allows developing countries 
that recognize the Montreal Protocol, such as 
Mexico, to continue using methyl bromide until 
2015. Production and importation of methyl bro-
mide by these countries is restricted to decreasing 
percentages of its 1995–1998 levels. Mexico’s 
baseline level has been set at 1,885 metric tons of 
methyl bromide. Mexico used 1,878 metric tons 
of methyl bromide in 1997. This includes uses for 
all purposes—not specifically for horticultural 
crops, as we investigate here. As of 2004, the 
United States had phased out 70 percent of its 
methyl bromide use. In the spring of 2004, the 
United States requested and received critical use 
exemptions for 2005 for 7,659 metric tons, delay-
ing the complete phaseout by at least one year. 
  The North American Free Trade Agreement 
was passed in 1993, decreasing tariffs on fruit 
and vegetable imports from Mexico. This change 
in comparative advantage was found to impact 
California and Florida horticultural producers 
(Cook et al. 1991). The subsequent decision to 
phase out methyl bromide was found to most di-
rectly impact California and Florida (Ferguson 
and Padula 1994). These two states, California 
and Florida, used 68 percent of the U.S. con-
sumption of methyl bromide in 1997, at 6,576 
metric tons and 5,125 metric tons, respectively. In 
that year, the United States as a whole used 
17,213.7 metric tons, with the major application 
crops being small fruits and vegetables (69 per-
cent), orchards and vineyards (15 percent), and 
nurseries (15 percent) (EPA 2002). Forty-seven 
percent of California’s total usage was applied on 
strawberries; in Florida, the number was 54 per-
cent for tomatoes, 29 percent for peppers, and 10 
percent for strawberries. Eggplant, cucumber, and 
squash growers also utilize methyl bromide in 
some production systems in Florida. Mexico is a 
major competitor in these crops but has not util-
ized methyl bromide widely except on strawber-
ries in Baja California. Currently, as mentioned 
above, Mexico is limited to 1,885 metric tons of 
methyl bromide, but does not have to phase it out 
until 2015. 
  To investigate the impact of the Montreal Pro-
tocol’s phaseout schedule on overall methyl bro-
mide use, we develop a theory of pest control 
adoption and the resulting supply curve for a 
crop. Using this theory, we develop an empirical 
model that analyzes the major methyl bromide 
users and regions to determine whether methyl 
bromide use will decrease or increase and what 
the resulting production pattern will be. 
 
Theoretical Model 
The case of methyl bromide illustrates the need 
for models that address heterogeneous regions as 
well as differences in environmental regulations 
between countries when exploring the question of 
a pollution haven. Because of heterogeneity, 
growers in certain regions may find it profitable 
to produce different crops and/or use different 
technologies. For example, heterogeneous regions 
produce agricultural crops with different yield 
loss levels resulting from weeds, diseases, and 
insects that can be based on soil type, weather 
patterns, and agricultural practices. Soil can con-
tain many types of pathogens that either consume 
a crop or compete with it for resources. Climatic 
conditions also impact a pest pathogen’s survival 
and limit the types of controls that are possible. In 
more temperate and tropical areas, for example, 
pathogens can survive over the winter months, 
and few natural conditions exist to control their 
populations. We incorporate these heterogeneous 
factors into the model in two ways: a land quality 
variable defined as the maximum potential yield 
under ideal conditions, and a pest pressure vari-
able defined as the percent decrease in potential 
yield due to local pathogens such as insects, 
weeds, fungi, and nematodes. The model can be 
generalized to distinguish different levels of pest 
damage and the resulting costs or benefits of pest 
control. 
  Rational producers with different quality land 
or pest pressures will use different technologies to 
produce the same crop. The interaction between 
crop yield and pathogens is important in deter-
mining where to plant different crops and in the 
impact of regulations affecting pest control 
strategies. In many locations, disease and weed 
problems are such that without effective control 
technologies, crop production would not be prof-
itable. 
  The effectiveness of the control technology can 
be measured by its ability to prevent crop damage 
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as a function of pest pressure. In many areas, 
growers choose to use little or no control due to 
its high cost, with the result that yield decreases. 
In other regions, they adopt very intensive control 
measures at high costs and lose relatively little 
yield due to pest pressure. These control tech-
niques combat the disease problems, increasing 
land’s realized yield. 
  The theoretical model contains two parts. One 
has a representative farmer who chooses whether 
or not to use the pest control technology (we then 
use this farmer to represent a region in the em-
pirical model). We find that the adoption of the 
pest control technology will change with in-
creases in output price, pest pressure, and land 
quality. Using this model, the switching point for 
adoption can be determined based on land quality 
and pest pressure. Given the behavior of the indi-
vidual growers, in the second part, we can gener-
ate an industry supply curve. Because the land is 
heterogeneous in both potential yield and pest 
pressure, we find varying levels of adoption of 
the pest control technology. 
  Let us denote the quality of a given parcel of 
agricultural land by ", assuming the absence of 
any pathogens. This land quality " can assume 
low values for land with little capacity to produce 
a crop (steep slopes, little or no topsoil, and no 
water-holding capacity) or land in hostile envi-
ronments. The highest land quality, "
M, has the 
maximum yield due to the best soils. The pest 
pressure, D, is assumed to be exogenous to the 
land quality and can vary by farm and location. 
Each acre is defined by an (",D) combination. 
Each farmer is assumed to have parcels with ho-
mogeneous land quality, although land quality 
varies across farmers. 
  Farmers can try to control the pathogens using 
technology m=1. They can also choose not to con-
trol the pathogens, technology m=0. For simplicity, 
we assume that only one technology can be used to 
control pests. The effectiveness of technology m is 
determined by its ability to decrease crop loss on a 
particular parcel. For example, if no disease pres-
sure exists, the realized yield per acre will equal the 
potential yield, y("); if disease pressure exists, the 
realized yield will be y(α)(1–km(D,x)), where 
y(α)km(D,x) is the quantity of yield destroyed by 
the pathogen’s presence under technology m. The 
variable level of control is x. As disease pressure 
increases, km(D,x) becomes larger. As chemical use 
increases,  km(D,x) becomes smaller. We assume 
that the proportion of crop lost is increasing at a 
decreasing rate (yield per acre is a decreasing func-
tion of disease 
22 0 kD ∂ ∂< ) and that the propor-
tion of crop lost is decreasing with control at an 
increasing rate 
22 0 kx ∂ ∂> . The cost per unit for 
the chemical is w , and the quantity used of the 
chemical is x(",D) for land quality " and pest pres-
sure D. Control costs per acre can be denoted by 
wx(",D). 
  For simplicity, we look at the theoretical model 
for one representative farmer growing one crop 
sold in one market assuming exogenous prices. 
Therefore, the only decision is whether to adopt 
the control technology or not. The empirical 
model will extend this approach to include more 
than one crop, region, and market. First, each 
farmer solves equation (1) to choose the optimal 
level of x(",D) given his or her land quality and 
disease pressure. Output price is denoted by P, pc 
is the per acre cost of using other inputs at their 
optimal level,
1 hc is the harvest cost per unit y, 
and tc is the transportation cost per unit y. Output 
is a function of land quality and pest pressure and 
is assumed to have constant returns to scale prop-
erties using pest control as the input: 
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All functions in the optimization problem are 
assumed to be twice continuously differentiable 
on their entire domains, and the decision variable 
 
1 We are implicitly assuming that chemical use and other inputs have 
no interaction with this formulation. In the empirical model, this is 
somewhat relaxed given the alternative technologies examined. 
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is subject to a nonnegativity constraint. The first-
order condition indicates that each farmer will use 
x up to the point where the marginal contribution 
to the value of the “saved” production minus the 
additional cost to harvest and transport the 
“saved” production equals the marginal variable 
cost of the control technology. If the control tech-
nology saves more production—i.e., if  kx ∂ ∂  is 
large—then a farmer is more likely to use the 
control technology given w, assuming of course 
that P ≥ hc + tc. 
  Second, each grower will compare the profits 
earned using pest control at this optimal level 
x*(ϕ) to not using any control as depicted in 
equation (2). The vector ϕ  describes the set of 
exogenous parameters (P,w,α,D,pc,hc,tc). Grow-
ers will use the control technology if 
(2)   
10
10
0 if ( )
[(,* () ) (, 0 ) ] * ()
0 if ( )
[ ( , *( )) ( ,0)] *( ).
xP y h c y t c y
kD x kD w x
xP y h c y t c y





If the resulting increase in the net revenue from 
the disease control is greater than the cost of the 
control, the grower will employ the control. If 
either the increased yield or the market prices are 
not sufficiently high, the grower might find that 
the increased net revenue does not cover the cost 
of the control technique. Some P, hc, and tc exists 
such that (-Py + hcy + tcy)(k1 – k0) > wx*(N), and 
the disease control technology will be used in this 
case. As the value of the crop increases, so does 
the value of controlling the pest damage. We find 
the standard results, i.e., that the optimal amount 
of control will increase with increases in output 
price and land quality, and decrease with an in-
crease in the variable costs of the chemical. Inter-
estingly, the impact of an increase in disease 
pressure is indeterminate: 
2 (, * )
[( ) ( ) ( ) ]
SOC
kDx
Py hcy tcy x xD
D
∂
α− α− α ∂ ∂∂ =
∂
. 
We know that as pest control use increases, the 
percent lost will decrease, so the question here is 
the cross partial. What happens to this relation-
ship as the disease pressure increases? If we can 
assume that as disease pressure increases, we 
have that 
2 (,* ) 0 kDx xD ∂∂ ∂ < , then the model 
would suggest that as disease pressure increases, 
the amount of pest control would increase. 
 We  can  define  "*(ϕ) as the switching quality 
of land based on output and disease pressure per 
acre where the profits earned under each technol-
ogy are equal or A1(ϕ) = A0(ϕ). All acreage above 
this marginal quality and pest pressure will em-
ploy the control technology. The lowest yielding 
land that will enter into production is denoted by 
"
s. The minimum quality land put into production 
is defined by A0 $0. For any land quality lower 
than "
s(ϕ), A0(ϕ) < 0, and this land will remain out 
of production. The highest yielding land is "
M. 
  Figure 1 depicts how profits are compared un-
der different land qualities for a given disease 
pressure to determine if using the control tech-
nology is optimal. Farmers with land quality be-
low "
s
0 will not put their land in production be-
cause profit is negative when no control technol-
ogy is used and quality below "
s
1 has negative 
profits when the control technology is used. 
Farmers with land quality between "
s
0 and "*(ϕ) 
will choose not to use the control technology. 
Farmers with land quality above "*(ϕ) will em-




To bridge the theoretical and empirical models, 
we shift from an individual farmer adopting pest 
control to a set of representative regions. Within 
each region, land is assumed to be homogeneous 
in pest pressure and land quality. Using " as the 
measure of land quality and D as pest pressure, 
we can define the joint distribution of acres with 
quality " and pest pressure D as g(",D). We as-
sume that g(",D) is continuous. Because the land 
is heterogeneous in both potential output and dis-
ease pressure, we find varying levels of adoption 
of disease control technologies, as depicted in 
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as the sum of the per acre yield multiplied by ag-
gregate acreage planted without using the control  











Figure 1. Comparing Profit Levels with 
Varying Land Qualities: Producers Adopt 
Control Technology (x > 0) with Land 
Qualities Greater Than α* 
 
 
technology, and of the per acre yield multiplied by 
aggregate acreage planted using the technology. 
  As price increases, the overall industry supply 
will increase in two ways. More regions will be-
gin to use the control technology, increasing yield 
on these acres. In addition, lower quality land will 
come into production. The change in the number 
of acres in production not using the technology 
depends on the magnitude of the intensive versus 
extensive margin (Figure 2). The solid curves in 
Figure 2 describe a possible technology choice 
profile for pest pressure/land quality combina-
tions. The curve DE indicates that there is a 
minimum land quality ("
s) below which produc-
tion is not profitable. It represents the locus of 
values of " that defines the extensive margin. The 
upward slope of the line shows that as land qual-
ity rises, the pest pressure threshold for which 
production becomes profitable increases. Curve 
EF indicates that for a given land quality, if pest 
pressure is high enough, it pays to adopt the con-
trol technology. This curve represents the locus of 
values of "* that defines the intensive margin. 
The downward slope of the curve shows that as 
land quality increases, the pest pressure threshold 
for which using the control technology is more 
profitable than not using it decreases, i.e., as the 
potential yield increases, the same percentage of 
loss is a greater number, and thus it becomes 
beneficial to use the control technology. If price 
rises, the curves shift to the left, as shown by the 
dashed lines. Marginal land comes into produc-
tion (area ABED), and the control technology 
becomes profitable for more land (area EFGC). 
The overall increase in control technology use is 
area BCFE. The intensive margin includes those 
acres that switch from no control to using the 
control technology. The extensive margin in-
cludes those acres that come into production. To 
determine if the extensive margin is greater than 
the intensive margin, one would compare the area 
ABED to BCFE. 
  Figure 3 depicts the situation where U.S. pro-
ducers move from being able to use the yield-
enhancing control technology to being banned 
from using the technology. The solid curve de-
picts the pre-ban extensive (curve AB) and inten-
sive (curve BC) margins. Regions with certain 
land quality and pest pressure will continue to 
produce the crop even without the technology. 
These regions lie in the area to the right of the 
dashed line (EFD). Land will come out of produc-
tion as it becomes unprofitable (area ABDE) or in 
a trading situation where regions have shifted 
production to another country or region. 
  As the cost of the control technology increases, 
fewer regions will adopt the control technology, 
which should increase the non-use acreage. As 
crop yield decreases overall, the market price of 
the crop may increase, which should result in 
some previously unprofitable land coming into 
production. Since the control is in effect increas-
ing the realized yield closer to the potential yield, 
a decrease in its use will result in more acres 
needed in production to achieve the same industry 
supply. We cannot determine whether, as pest 
pressure increases, more or fewer acres will be 
using the technology. 
  If the control technology has negative external-
ities, society will want to restrict its use. If the 
consequences of doing so fall most heavily on a 
certain country, or if the consumers in one area 
are willing to pay higher prices for the farm prod-
uct in order to prevent the externalities, a regula-
tion may be imposed that impacts only part of the 
land under cultivation. The potential yield of 
acres previously using the control will decrease 
(intensive margin), and some of this acreage may 
become unprofitable and stop production (exten-
sive margin). We may see non-regulated regions 
that had never adopted the technology before 
begin to use it if decreased supply increases the 
market price of the farm product sufficiently. 





























Solid lines = before price increase
Dashed lines = after price increase
 
Figure 2. Intensive (EF) and Extensive (DE) 
Margins for Pest Control Use for Varying 
Levels of Land Quality and Disease Pressure 
Before and After Crop Price Increase 
 
  If domestic regions do not face competition 
from foreign regions, this regulation enforces 
restricted production similar to a monopoly or 
monopolistic market structure. Because less 
product is on the market, the price is higher, and 
those regions not plagued by pest pressure will 
benefit from the regulation. In addition, some 
affected regions may have higher profits by not 
purchasing the control technology, thus having 
lower costs and receiving a higher market price if 
the percent increase in price is greater than the 
percent decrease in quantity. 
  However, if foreign regions respond to the new 
regulation and the higher prices, their increased 
production may drive domestic regions out of 
production. This increased foreign production can 
come from (i) land switching from non-use to use 
of the control technology, and (ii) new land com-
ing into production. Depending on the magnitude 
of the price change and the level of previous use 
of control technology in the foreign country, the 
overall effect may be a net increase in the level of 
use of the control technology. 
  If the negative consequences from the control 
technology are local, the domestic country has 
shifted the environmental problem to another 
country, in essence creating a pollution haven. If 































Figure 3. U.S. Production Following Ban on 
Pest Control Use 
Notes: To right of curve EFD, growers will continue to pro-
duce without the technology. Land depicted as area ABED 
will come out of production. 
such as with methyl bromide, the domestic coun-
try may not achieve its environmental objective, 
while at the same time imposing losses on its 
producers. We are interested in seeing how dif-
ferences in cost and yield for crops using methyl 
bromide will affect trade on a region-by-region 






To determine which of the scenarios outlined 
above will occur, we examine the impact of a 
unilateral ban of methyl bromide on the horticul-
tural crops that use methyl bromide extensively 
and that compete with Mexican producers.
2 To 
this end, the annual horticultural market including 
those regions where methyl bromide is used 
(California, Florida, South Carolina, and North 
Carolina), as well as their direct competitors 
(Mexico, Texas, and Georgia), is modeled as a 
spatial partial equilibrium problem. The model 
follows the early work of Takayama and Judge 
                                                                                    
2 A unilateral ban was in place until 1997. Currently, Mexico also 
faces some restrictions on methyl bromide use under the Montreal 
Protocol, which we address when discussing the results. 




(1971) as well as similar models that have ana-
lyzed the methyl bromide problem (Deepak, 
Spreen, and VanSickle 1996; Carpenter, Gianessi, 
and Lynch 2000). This model is extended to in-
clude a technology or pest control adoption deci-
sion as outlined above. 
  The empirical model replaces the representative 
farmer with a representative region, denoted j. 
Within each region, all land is assumed to be of 
similar quality and to face similar pest pressure; 
all farmers within a region are assumed to follow 
common production patterns. However, crops, 
costs, yields, and pest pressure vary by region due 
to geographic, climatic, and other differences. 
Each region selects whether or not to adopt 
methyl bromide into its production practices. The 
sum over all regions’ production comprises the 
total supply of a particular crop. 
  Because methyl bromide is used on several 
crops within these regions, the model is further 
extended to consider six crops, denoted i. Each 
crop may be grown using one or more production 
systems, with index h designating the production 
systems. Each crop and region has a specific set 
of production practices that are commonly used. 
For example, cucumbers are grown using one of 
five production systems: as a single crop, spring 
planting, fall planting, double-cropped following 
peppers, or double-cropped following tomatoes. 
Production systems are limited to those currently 
used in each region. Since yields are not known 
for crops in regions where they are not grown, 
regions are not allowed to shift production into 
crops not currently grown. Each region will 
choose the acreage Lijhm of each crop it will plant 
using technology m, where m = 1 denotes using 
methyl bromide and m = 0 represents non-use of 
methyl bromide. 
  The theoretical model is also extended here to 
include the demand side of the market. Given that 
the regions included represent a large percentage 
of the crop production for the United States, we 
do not assume exogenous prices but instead per-
mit the price to adjust as supply changes. Each 
region faces a market price in four representative 
markets, denoted k. In addition, because prices 
and yields vary over the year, we extend the theo-
retical model to permit differences for each of the 
twelve months, denoted t. 
  The empirical model maximizes social welfare 
(SW) as follows: 
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  We compute the equilibrium levels of supply 
for each crop in each region in each month, Yijt, 
the quantity shipped of each crop from each re-
gion to each market in each month, Vijkt, the quan-
tity consumed in each market of each crop in each 
month, Qikt, as well as the number of acres in each 
crop in each region in each production system in 
each pest control technology, Lijhm. The objective 
is to maximize social welfare (7a), subject to re-
gional production limited to planted acres multi-
plied by realized yield (constraint 7b), shipment 
quantity limited to quantity produced (constraint 
7c), and quantity consumed limited to quantity 
shipped (constraint 7d). 
  The pre-harvest cost per acre of crop i in region 
j for production system h in pest control technol-
ogy m is pcijhm. The cost of methyl bromide per 
unit is w. The amount used per acre is xijhm. Har-
vest and post-harvest costs, which include har-
vesting, packing, hauling, grading, cooling, tar-
iffs, etc., is hcij, the per ton cost per crop per re-
gion. These costs do not vary by month. Thus the 
total harvest and post-harvest costs are repre-
sented by hcij* Yijt for crop i in region j. The trans-
portation cost per ton from region j to demand 
market k is tcijk. Vijkt is the total shipments of crop i, 
from region j to market k in month t. The total cost 
of transport per month for crop i from region j to 
market k in month t is represented by tcijk*Vijkt. 
  All producers in a particular region are as-
sumed to use the same production and pest con-
trol technology and to therefore have the same 
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yields and same costs, but it is assumed that 
across regions there is variation. Parameter yijhtm 
is the per acre yield in crop i in month t in region 
j for production system h for pest control tech-
nology m. Methyl bromide is a yield-enhancing 
technology; the yield without methyl bromide is 
some fraction of the potential yield. Yields per 
acre using methyl bromide and using the alterna-
tive technologies are assumed to be non-stochastic. 
While per acre yields for fruit and vegetables 
vary from year to year, some of the technologies 
included are not currently being used in these 
regions, and thus data on yields over time are not 
available. 
  In this formulation, there is some region j that 
has land quality αs such that it will not grow crop 
i at all; another region j with land quality between 
αs and α* that will grow crop i but without using 
the methyl bromide technology, m = 0; another 
region will have land quality greater than α*, will 
grow crop i, and will use methyl bromide tech-
nology, m = 1. The unobserved values α are not 
known  a priori. The model will choose which 
regions increase, decrease, or stop production for 
each crop according to relative yield and cost 
differences between regions. 
  The inverse demand curve or the marginal 
benefits curve is represented as Pikt= aikt – bikt Qikt. 
The demand curve’s intercept is aikt and its slope 
is bikt.
3 The slope of the demand function is as-
sumed to be constant over all quantities, and each 
region’s production is assumed to be a perfect 
substitute for any other region’s. The model as-
sumes that the price of each commodity is a func-
tion of its own quantity alone—that is, Qikt is the 
total quantity demanded as a function of Pikt, the 
per unit price for the ith
 crop in the kth market in 
month  t—and that the price is not affected by 
other crop prices or quantities that may be sold in 
that market in that month. If this simplification 
were not assumed, the integrability problem ad-
dressed by McCarl and Spreen (1980) and Peters 
and Spreen (1989) would become an issue. 
 
 
                                                                                   
3 The true marginal benefits curve would be the Hicksian demand 
curve rather than the Marshallian demand curve. However, Willig 
(1976) found that evaluating consumer surplus with the Marshallian 




The analysis of the annual horticultural market 
model includes six crops: tomatoes, strawberries, 
peppers, cucumbers, squash, and eggplants. 
Strawberries and tomatoes alone account for 40 
percent of total pre-plant use of methyl bromide. 
Cucumber and squash are included in the model 
to reflect the impact that the ban will have on the 
double-crop production system employed in Flor-
ida, where these crops follow tomatoes or pep-
pers. These crops are planted into the same plastic 
mulches as the first crops, thus benefiting from 
the fumigation of the first crops. The EPA has not 
authorized the direct use of methyl bromide on 
cucumbers or squash. 
  Several factors were considered to determine 
which production areas would be included in the 
model. The production regions that use methyl 
bromide were identified and included. Other pro-
duction areas within the United States that do not 
use methyl bromide were included if in any one 
month they shipped at least 10 percent of the U.S. 
total shipments for that commodity according to 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural 
Marketing Service (AMS).
5 California, Florida, 
and Mexico were divided into regions to reflect 
differences in production practices and harvest 
dates. California has four regions: South Coast, 
Central Coast, Imperial Valley, and San Joaquin 
Valley. Florida has five: Northwest, Central, 
Southeast, Southwest, and Dade County. Mexico 
has two: Sinaloa and Baja California/Sonora. 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and 
Texas are included as individual regions. 
  Harvested acres were based on three-year aver-
ages for crop years 1993–1994 through 1995–
 
4 This data description condenses the details of the data collection 
and sources that can be found in Carpenter, Gianessi, and Lynch 
(2000). 
5 Determining if regions exist that could enter the market following 
the ban but that are currently not producing these crops is difficult. The 
horticultural industry has experienced a great deal of change in the last 
decade, in particular a shift to distribution by integrated grow-
ers/shippers. As the major buyers consolidate, they demand special 
packing, product differentiation, promotional support, and year-round 
supply (Wilson, Thompson, and Cook 1997). This demand has resulted 
in more vertical integration in the produce industry (Calvin and Barrios 
1998). Therefore, even as certain regions’ comparative advantage 
improves following the phaseout of methyl bromide, these regions may 
not be able to enter certain market windows. Increased competition 
from other regions such as Central America, the Caribbean, and Chile 
could also occur, but supply increases from these regions are not 
incorporated.  
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1996 [Florida Agricultural Statistics Service 
(various years), California Agricultural Statistics 
Service (various years), California Strawberry 
Commission (1998), Georgia Agricultural Statis-
tics Service (1997), North Carolina Agricultural 
Statistics Service (various years), South Carolina 
Agricultural Statistics Service (various years), 
Texas Agricultural Statistics Service (various 
years)]. Monthly vegetable imports were aver-
aged over a three-year period (U.S. Department 
of Agriculture 1997). Harvested acres for Sinaloa 
were obtained from a Mexican grower associa-
tion, CAADES (Confederation of Agriculture 
Associations of the State of Sinaloa) (CAADES 
1996). Mexican average yields by state were ob-
tained from the Mexican Department of Agricul-
ture (various years). Harvested acres for export 
from Baja and Sonora were obtained from a vari-
ety of sources [Cook et al. (1991), the Sonoran 
Growers’ Association (various years), Mexican 
Department of Agriculture (various years)]. 
  Demand parameters included flexibilities (Scott 
1991, Spreen et al. 1995). Wholesale prices from 
the four representative markets—Atlanta, Chi-
cago, Los Angeles, and New York—(AMS, vari-
ous years) were used to compute average monthly 
prices over the three-year period. Average 
monthly arrivals over the three-year period were 
computed from arrival data (AMS, various years). 
Shipment data were used to determine the total 
demand in each market area. Arrival data were 
used to calculate the slope of the total demand 
curve; this data was adjusted to reflect the total 
demand in the market area in order to determine 
the demand curve intercept. 
  Transportation costs were determined by using 
distance from production region to market, ob-
tained from Mapquest (http://www.mapquest.com/). 
The average per mile transportation cost was 
$1.31, derived from the “Fruit and Vegetable 
Truck Rate and Cost Summary” (AMS, various 
years). 
  Production and harvest costs were computed 
from the extension budgets of the various states. 
CAADES budgets from various years, Cook et al. 
(1991), VanSickle et al. (1994), and the Sonoran 
Growers Association provided the information 
used to generate costs of production for Mexican 
growers. Annual per acre yield estimates were 
computed from the three years of annual yields 
[Florida Agricultural Statistics Service (various 
years), California Agricultural Statistics Service 
(various years), California Strawberry Commis-
sion (1998), Georgia Agricultural Statistics Ser-
vice (1997), North Carolina Agricultural Statis-
tics Service (various years), South Carolina Agri-
cultural Statistics Service (various years), Texas 
Agricultural Statistics Service (various years)]. 
  All regions can use methyl bromide (pre-U.S. 
ban) or an alternative technology to produce 
crops. Exact figures on how much methyl bro-
mide is used are not available, as growers can 
choose to do bed fumigation or full field fumiga-
tion. While the majority of growers follow the 
label rate, some growers alter the quantities. After 
interviews with extension personnel, growers, 
farm advisers, and chemical salespeople, the 
amount of methyl bromide used per acre was de-
termined (Carpenter, Gianessi, and Lynch 2000). 
One alternative technology was determined for 
each crop/region combination. The alternatives 
for crops that currently use methyl bromide are 
presented in Table 1. Alternative technologies 
were determined through information obtained in 
journal articles as well as through interviews and 
workshops with growers, scientists, and farm 
advisers (Carpenter, Gianessi, and Lynch 2000). 
Alternative technologies chosen were those with 
the lowest per unit cost. The changes in pre-
harvest costs are presented in Table 2, and per-
centage change in yield expected if methyl bro-
mide is not used is presented in Table 3. 
 Information  on  Mexico  was collected by faxing 
a questionnaire to key individuals involved in the 
horticultural industry in Mexico, asking them 
general questions regarding the use and cost of  
 
Table 1. Alternative Pest Control Strategies to 
Methyl Bromide 
Crop  Pest Control Alternative 
Eggplant  Telone C-17 + Napropamide 
Pepper  Telone C-17 + Napropamide 
Strawberry  Telone C-17 + Napropamide in 
Florida 
Chloropicrin + Vapam in 
California 
Tomato  Telone C-17 + Pebulate in Florida 
Vapam + Pebulate in Dade County, 
Florida 
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Table 3. Annual Yield with Methyl Bromide (tons per acre) and Percent Adjustment with 
Alternative Pest Control 
REGION  Crop  Rotation  Annual yield  Adjusted yield 
Florida        
 Central  cucumber   12.3  1 
  squash   13.0  1 
  strawberry   13.2  0.785 
  pepper fall  13.4  0.875 
  pepper spring  13.4  0.875 
  pepper pepper/squash  9.9  0.875 
  squash pepper/squash 11.5  0.825 
  cucumber tomato/cucumber 13.5  0.825 
  tomato tomato/cucumber  16.1  0.9 
  tomato fall  16.9  0.9 
  tomato spring  16.1  0.9 
  squash tomato/squash 11.5  0.825 
  tomato tomato/squash 16.7  0.9 
 Southwest  cucumber   13.0  1 
  pepper   13.7  0.875 
  squash   15.4  1 
  cucumber pepper/cucumber 13.1  0.825 
  pepper pepper/cucumber  10.6  0.875 
  cucumber tomato/cucumber 13.5  0.825 
  tomato tomato/cucumber  14.9  0.9 
  tomato fall  14.9  0.9 
  tomato spring  15.0  0.9 
  squash tomato/squash 15.4  0.825 
  tomato tomato/squash 14.9  0.9 
 Southeast  cucumber   13.0  1 
  eggplant   12.5  0.85 
  pepper   14.0  0.875 
  tomato   16.1  0.9 
  cucumber pepper/cucumber 12.4  0.825 
  pepper pepper/cucumber  11.4  0.875 
  cucumber tomato/cucumber 13.5  0.825 
  tomato tomato/cucumber  16.1  0.9 
 Northwest  tomato fall  16.0  0.9 
  tomato spring  16.0  0.9 
 Dade  County  squash   13.4  1 
  tomato   16.1  0.825 
  squash tomato/squash 13.3  0.78 
  tomato tomato/squash 16.2  0.825 
table cont’d. 
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Table 3. Annual Yield with Methyl Bromide (tons per acre) and Percent Adjustment with 
Alternative Pest Control (cont’d.) 
REGION  Crop  Rotation  Annual yield  Adjusted yield 
Mexico          
 Baja  California  cucumber   10.4  0.95 
  eggplant   7.1  0.95 
  pepper   9.3  0.95 
  squash   6.4  0.95 
  strawberry   17.0  0.785 
  tomato   19.3  0.95 
 Sinaloa  cucumber   12.8  0.95 
  eggplant   13.3  0.95 
  pepper   6.0  0.95 
  squash   7.4  0.95 
  tomato   14.3  0.95 
California        
 Central  Coast  strawberry   21.0  0.785 
  tomato   20.2  0.85 
 South  Coast  strawberry   18.3  0.785 
  tomato   21.5  0.9 
  San Joaquin Valley  tomato   13.9  0.82 
 Imperial  Valley  tomato   15.0  0.82 
Texas pepper    7.4  0.875 
Georgia cucumber  fall  7.0  1 
 cucumber  spring  7.0  1 
 tomato  fall  15.9  0.9 
 tomato  spring  16.0  0.9 
North Carolina  pepper    2.3  0.875 
 cucumber  fall  5.0  1 
 cucumber  spring  5.0  1 
South Carolina  tomato    17.8  0.9 
 
methyl bromide there (Lynch 1996). Those con-
tacted were also asked for names of other people 
or organizations who might provide information. 
If no response was received, a letter was mailed. 
Field interviews were used to complete the data 
collection. The interview team visited the Mexi-
can states of Baja California, Sinaloa, Sonora, 
and Guanajuato during the fall of 1994 and met 
with government officials and producer associa-
tions. The team also visited growers at their 
farms. The team observed common cultural prac-
tices being used in Mexico by region and by com-
modity and collected accurate measures of the 
cost of production and yield effect of different 
practices. Methyl bromide was not used on a 
widespread basis except in Baja for strawberries. 
The cost differential was considered too high for 
the resulting yield augmentation; methyl bromide 
was therefore used on only a small percentage of 
the acreage in any one year. We assume a cost 
differential of $500 per acre when using methyl 
bromide for all crops except Baja strawberries, 
and a yield augmentation of 5 percent. 
  We analyze two cases—one with no land con-
straint and one limiting each crop to a 50 percent 
increase of the baseline acreage—following the 
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imposition of the methyl bromide regulations in 
the United States. Given that land can be scarce, 
can be of limited fertility, or can have a high op-
portunity cost (for example, it can be sold for 
residential development), the 50 percent land 
constraint may actually be too lax, i.e., in the 
short run growers cannot expand acreage by 50 
percent. In some regions, this constraint could 
represent the potential need for pre- and post-
harvest resources such as cooling facilities and 





The spatial equilibrium model was calibrated to 
establish the market baseline using GAMS Rev 
119 software. The model estimates acreage 
planted by region, production system and pest 
control technology, monthly shipments from each 
region to each market by crop, and monthly sales 
for each crop by market. The post-ban results are 
compared to the pre-ban baseline. In addition to 
the baseline scenario, the following cases were 
analyzed: 
 
(i)  where the United States is limited to 0 per-
cent of baseline methyl bromide usage; no 
land constraint 
(ii)  where the United States is limited to 0 per-
cent of baseline methyl bromide; land in
each crop is limited to 150 percent of base-
line, i.e., only a 50 percent increase permit-
ted on new land coming into production 
 
  The two cases reflect the total phaseout that 
was targeted for 2005 in the United States. These 
illustrate the longer-run behavior in the industry 
when critical use exemptions are no longer per-
mitted. The 150 percent land constraint is meant 
to reflect possible short-run limitations to bring-
ing new land into production. 
  Baseline planted acreage is shown in Table 4. 
The baseline acreage for all crops falls within 10 
percent of the average acreage planted in these 
regions by crop for 1993–1996. Regions in which 
producers choose to use methyl bromide in the 
baseline results are the same regions where a ma-
jority of producers choose to use methyl bromide 
in reality. The only anomaly was California’s 
Central Coast’s choice to use methyl bromide on 
its tomato acres—in reality the majority of grow-
ers in this region do not employ this technology. 
Baseline methyl bromide usage on the set of 
crops considered is 10,330 metric tons. 
  Tables 5 and 6 show the planted acreage for the 
two post-ban cases. With few exceptions, the total 
production for each crop remains close to the 
baseline in each case, although production within 
and between regions has altered. In both cases, 
large shifts in crop acreage were found between 
regions, but in total the post-ban planted acreage 
does not change substantially. Exceptions are 
peppers, which exhibit a 14–18 percent increase 
in planted acreage in both cases, and strawberries, 
which show a 15 percent increase for case 1 and a 
20 percent increase for case 2. In both scenarios, 
production of all crops increases in Mexico, with 
interregional shifts occurring in the United States. 
There are changes in the regions where produc-
tion occurs. 
  With a total ban on methyl bromide imposed in 
the United States, with no constraint on acres 
planted (case 1), there is a great amount of re-
gion-shifting, both between the United States and 
Mexico and within the United States. Surpris-
ingly, Mexico does not switch to methyl bromide 
for any crop (it does continue to use methyl bro-
mide for Baja strawberries), indicating that the 
additional cost to use the technology ($500 per 
acre) outweighs the yield enhancement (5 per-
cent). Eggplant production ceases entirely in the 
United States, offset by a 48 percent increase in 
Mexican production. Pepper production sees in-
terregional shifting within Florida, and an in-
crease in production in Texas (a non-methyl bro-
mide user) and Mexico. Squash exhibits similar 
characteristics. The most striking result is that 
Baja increases strawberry acreage tenfold. As 
Baja increases its strawberry acreage, California 
strawberry growers decrease production. Tomato 
production shows shifts of production from 
methyl bromide using regions to non-methyl 
bromide using regions (Imperial Valley, Georgia, 
and Baja). 
  For case 2, there is a total ban on methyl bro-
mide in the United States and a 150 percent limit 
on acres planted. With the available land limited, 
we see a similar overall shift in production to 
Mexico. Squash production shifts entirely to 
Mexico, except for that in Central Florida, where 
it increases by 13 percent. Southeast Florida to-
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Table 5. Planted Acreage, Post-Ban, by Crop and Region (no land constraint) 
 Crop 
REGION  Cucumber Eggplant Pepper Squash Strawberry  Tomato 
Florida            
 Central  3,816   2,958  5,401  5,497  13,693 
 Southwest  2,469   14,474      17,537 
 Southeast  4,787 0 0      9,614 
 Northwest          384 
 Dade  County      5,986    2,473 
California            
 Central  Coast        5,247 0 
 South  Coast        8,223 0 
  San Joaquin Valley          31,666 
 Imperial  Valley          3,830 
Other U.S.             
 Texas     8,100       
 Georgia  13,263        9,404 
 North  Carolina  5,920   6,569       
 South  Carolina          1,545 
Total U.S.  30,255  0  32,101  11,387  18,967  90,146 
Mexico            
 Baja  California  3,994 282  4,588  8,543  14,693  21,834 
 Sinaloa  8,219 3,362  15,367  7,741   28,591 
Total Mexico  12,213  3,644  19,955  16,284  14,693  50,425 
Total acres planted  42,468  3,644  52,056  27,671  33,660  140,571 
 
  Monthly price changes ranged from a decrease 
in the price of cucumbers of -0.7 percent to an 
increase in the price of strawberries of 20 percent, 
both in the Los Angeles market (Table 7). Cu-
cumbers had the least fluctuation in price, fol-
lowed by tomatoes. Strawberries had the largest 
price increases (16.5–20 percent) in all the mar-
kets, followed by peppers (7.1–17.1 percent). 
These price increases negatively affect consumers 
but benefit growers. 
  On the consumption side, given the price in-
crease, we find that consumer surplus declines for 
each crop when a methyl bromide ban is imposed 
(Table 8). The overall surplus ($3.5 billion) de-
creases $107.2 million under the no land con-
straint case, and $133.6 million with the land 
constraint. Changes range from virtually no de-
cline for cucumbers and squash (crops that do not 
use methyl bromide except in the double cropping 
system) to 7.9 percent for strawberries, for which 
all regions in the United States and Mexico use 
methyl bromide. Strawberries account for the 
majority of the decreased surplus. 
  Methyl bromide use decreases substantially. 
The baseline U.S. methyl bromide use is 10,330 
metric tons, with Mexico using only 117 metric 
tons. Without the land constraint, Mexico’s total 
methyl bromide use is 1,309 metric tons, far less 
than the amount eliminated from use in the 
United States. Post-ban, Mexico responds by in-
creasing production, but does not increase its use 
of methyl bromide significantly. U.S. regions that 
do not use methyl bromide before the ban also 
increase acreage. The 1,309 metric tons is less 
than the current limitation of 1,885 metric tons 
that Mexico has agreed to abide by. However, if 
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Table 6. Planted Acreage, Post-Ban, by Crop and Region (150 percent land constraint) 
 Crop 
REGION  Cucumber Eggplant Pepper Squash Strawberry  Tomato 
Florida            
 Central  3,856   3,494  2,227  6,285  15,370 
 Southwest  2,458   12,298  3,290    19,579 
 Southeast  4,801 0  2,506      8,089 
 Northwest          2,412 
 Dade  County      5,607    1,767 
California            
 Central  Coast        12,560 0 
 South  Coast        14,568 0 
  San Joaquin Valley          34,534 
 Imperial  Valley          2,371 
Other U.S.             
 Texas     6,941       
 Georgia  13,236        5,733 
 North  Carolina  5,919   6,569       
 South  Carolina          3,416 
Total U.S.  30,270  0  31,808  11,124  33,413  93,271 
Mexico            
 Baja  California  3,983 373  4,644  7,979  1,964  18,881 
 Sinaloa  8,218 3,287  14,331  8,033   28,942 
Total Mexico  12,201  3,660  18,975  16,012  1,964  47,823 
Total acres planted  42,471  3,660  50,783  27,136  35,377  141,094 
 
Mexico is currently using the 1,885 metric tons 
for other purposes beside these horticultural 
crops, these crops will have to outbid the other 
users to obtain the rights to use the methyl bro-
mide. 
  While Mexico’s post-ban methyl bromide use 
does not increase significantly in the model, a 
reduction in the assumed cost differential of $500 
per acre between methyl bromide and alternative 
technologies or an improvement of yield using 
methyl bromide greater than 5 percent could elicit 
additional adoption. For example, if using methyl 
bromide cost only $400 more per acre and the 
yield augmentation remained 5 percent, Mexico 
would adopt methyl bromide on all planted crops 
except cucumbers and squash following the ban, 
even though baseline use remained the same at 
117 metric tons. This would increase Mexico’s 
methyl bromide use to 6,404 metric tons, substan-
tially more than the pre-ban baseline of 117 met-
ric tons. Even with this higher level of adoption, 
use in North America overall would still be re-
duced by almost 4,000 metric tons following the 
ban.
6 Similarly, if using methyl bromide technol-
ogy cost $500 more per acre and the yield aug-
mentation was 20 percent, Mexican producers 
would adopt the methyl bromide technology after 
the ban. Under this scenario, fewer acres would 
be planted, as yield would be 20 percent more per 
acre, and Mexico methyl bromide use would in-
crease to only 4,027 metric tons. 
                                                                                    
6 Mexico is currently limited to 1,885 metric tons of methyl bromide 
under the Montreal Protocol. Therefore, using 6,404 metric tons or 
4,027 metric tons would violate its quota limitation unless it obtained 
critical use exemptions. Until 1997 however, Mexico had no restriction 
on use, and if it had begun to employ this level at that time, that could 
potentially have been incorporated into Mexico’s baseline quota. 
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Table 7. Average Monthly Price Changes, by Crop and Market (150 percent land 
constraint) 
 Cucumber  Eggplant  Pepper  Squash  Strawberry  Tomato 
Atlanta 1.3%  8.1%  11.6% 4.2%  17.1% 3.7% 
Chicago 1.1%  1.2%  7.1% 1.6%  17.1% 2.8% 
Los  Angeles -0.7%  1.0% 17.1%  0.1% 20.0%  0.4% 
New York  1.4%  7.5%  9.4% 4.0%  16.5% 3.6% 
 
 
Table 8. Change in Consumer Surplus (pre-ban total $3,503,962,815) 
  No land constraint  150% land constraint 
Cucumber -0.8%  -0.8% 
Eggplant -3.8%  -4.5% 
Pepper -1.7%  -1.8% 
Squash -1.3%  -1.3% 
Strawberry -5.9%  -7.9% 
Tomato -1.5%  -1.7% 




These results indicate how, given certain assump-
tions and the computed baseline, the horticultural 
sector will change once methyl bromide becomes 
unavailable in the United States. These results 
support scenario 2, outlined in the introduction. 
Production shifts to Mexico, methyl bromide use 
decreases overall, domestic production decreases 
overall, and domestic prices increase. This sug-
gests that the environmental goal of reducing 
methyl bromide use will be achieved and that a 
pollution haven in Mexico will not be created 
unless the cost differential is less than and/or the 
yield improvement is greater than expected. 
However, if the cost differential is less than 
and/or the yield improvement is greater than ex-
pected, why is Mexico not currently adopting 
methyl bromide on a broader scale, that is, why 
does it use so little in the baseline? While the 
assumed change in yields and costs is an attempt 
to look beyond a one-year horizon, these results 
do not reflect long-run adjustments that may be 
made in an industry. For example, if growers 
were to shift to green beans, which were not one 
of the crops considered in the model, the model 
would reflect only that the acreage had gone out 
of tomatoes—it would not reflect the additional 
net revenue that may be gained from green bean 
production. Similarly, under the case of no land 
constraint, prices would increase by a smaller 
amount, decreasing the impact on consumers and 
increasing the impact on producers. Likewise, if a 
region not included in the model were to enter the 
market in these months, the model might overes-
timate the effect on consumers and underestimate 
the effect on producers. 
  The results show that the ban on methyl bro-
mide will shift production location to some de-
gree but will not increase methyl bromide use in 
Mexico dramatically. Some regions will find that 
it is no longer profitable to continue producing 
the crop at the same acreage as they did before 
the ban. Other regions will find that their relative 
comparative advantage has increased and they 
will actually increase production. Since some 
regions in California, Texas, and Mexico do not 
use methyl bromide, their costs and expected 
yields should not change. In most cases, they are 
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able to respond by increasing production; a few 
regions increase production of certain crops until 
they hit the land constraint. Therefore, we see a 
situation where the environmental regulation 
shifts production to “less” polluting regions, as-
suming that ozone depletion is the only pollutant 
of concern. The change in quantity and thus the 
change in price depend on impacts in competing 
regions and the assumed demand flexibilities. 
While all the flexibilities assume that the percent-
age change in price will be less than the percent-
age change in quantity, the resulting change in 
price is sometimes sufficient to cover the in-
creased cost of the alternative pest control. 
  Given that the major impact of the regulation is 
borne by consumers, the relevant question is 
whether the benefits of less methyl bromide use 
and less ozone depletion are greater than the addi-
tional costs consumers will incur for the affected 
fruits and vegetables. At this time, little informa-
tion is available to assess this trade-off calcula-
tion. Similarly, the identified alternatives may 
have their own environmental costs: the overall 
decrease in ozone depletion may be offset by in-
creased water quality problems, for example. 
  While the phaseout of methyl bromide importa-
tion and production in the developed world was 
scheduled to be completed by 2005, the critical 
use exemptions granted for U.S. producers and 
others for 2005 indicate that methyl bromide con-
tinues to be used. The United States plans to re-
quest exemptions for 2006 as well. Although it 
has decreased its use of methyl bromide by 31.7 
percent between 1991 and 1999, it continues to 
account for 92 percent of the North American 
methyl bromide use (EPA 2002). As the phaseout 
has progressed, the price of methyl bromide has 
increased from $2.28 per pound in 1993 to $5.32 
in 2002, a 133 percent increase (National Agri-
cultural Statistics Service, various years), induc-
ing many producers to shift to alternative pest 
control or to use less methyl bromide in the mix 
of chemicals employed. As mentioned above, 
Mexico has agreed to limit its use to its 1995–
1998 average use level. Under the baseline as-
sumptions of the model, Mexico will increase its 
use, but not beyond the permitted amount. How-
ever, we do find that if methyl bromide cost only 
$400 more per acre than not using it, instead of 
the $500 more per acre assumed in the model, and 
if the yield augmentation were 5 percent, Mexico 
would adopt methyl bromide on all planted crops 
except cucumbers and squash following the ban 
in the U.S., increasing Mexico’s methyl bromide 
use to 6,404 metric tons. Similarly, if the cost 
differential were $500 and the yield augmentation 
were 20 percent, we find that Mexico would in-
crease its methyl bromide use to 4,027 metric 
tons. However, even if the cost differential and/or 
yield augmentation justified additional methyl 
bromide adoption, in order to increase its use 
levels Mexico would have to either seek exemp-
tions from the Protocol parties or be in noncom-
pliance with its treaty obligations. 
  This model and empirical approach can be used 
for other trade and environment issues in which 
the technology adoption decision is made based 
on heterogeneous factors like pest pressure, land 
quality, capital availability, degree of skilled la-
bor, etc., and where differing regulations are im-
posed. In this case, we demonstrate that a pollu-
tion haven is not created in one country as the 
result of a pre-existing, more stringent regulation 
in another, but the converse could equally be true. 
Similarly, the model could be employed to ana-
lyze the differential effects of another pesticide 
regulation on different regions where pest pres-




Agricultural Marketing Service. Various years. The following 
publications were consulted: “Fresh Fruit and Vegetable 
Arrivals in Western Cities,” Atlanta Wholesale Market 
Prices, Fresh Fruits and Vegetables,” “Chicago Fruit and 
Vegetable Wholesale Market Prices,” “Los Angeles Fresh 
Fruit and Vegetable Wholesale Market Prices,” “Fresh Fruit 
and Vegetable Shipments,” and “New York City Wholesale 
Prices and Arrivals” (the last unpublished by Scott Miller). 
Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agri-
culture, Washington, D.C. 
Agricultural Marketing Service. Various years. “Fruit and Vege-
table Truck Rate and Cost Summary.” Agricultural Marketing 
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 
AMS [see Agricultural Marketing Service]. 
CAADES. 1996. “Presentacion de Resultados Temporada 
Horticola, 1990-1995.” Asembla Estatal Especializada de 
Productores de Hortalizas, Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico. 
California Agricultural Statistics Service. Various years. “Ag-
ricultural Commissioners’ Data.” California Agricultural 
Statistics Service, Sacramento, CA. 
California Strawberry Commission. 1998. Strawberry produc-
tion statistics provided by Christopher Winterbottom, Cali-
fornia Strawberry Commission, Watsonville, CA. 
 Lynch, Malcolm, and Zilberman  The Case of Methyl Bromide   73 
 
Calvin, L., and V. Barrios. 1998. “Marketing Winter Vegeta-
bles from Mexico.” Vegetables and Specialties Situation 
and Outlook Report (April): 29–38. Economic Research 
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 
Carpenter, J., L. Gianessi, and L. Lynch. 2000. “The Economic 
Impact of the Scheduled U.S. Phaseout of Methyl Bromide.” 
National Center for Food and Agricultural Policy, Washing-
ton, D.C. Available online at http://www.ncfap.org (accessed 
April 2000). 
Confederation of Agriculture Associations of the State of 
Sinaloa [see CAADES]. 
Cook, R.L., C. Benito, J. Matson, D. Runsten, K. Shwedel, 
and T. Taylor. 1991. “Implications of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for the U.S. Horticultural 
Sector.” In NAFTA: Effects on Agriculture (Vol. IV: “Fruit 
and Vegetable Issues”). U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Washington, D.C. 
Copeland , B.R., and M.S. Taylor. 2003. “Trade, Growth and 
the Environment.” Working Paper No. 9823, National Bu-
reau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Dean, J.M. 1992. “Trade and the Environment: A Survey of 
the Literature.” In P. Low, ed., International Trade and the 
Environment. World Bank Discussion Paper No. 159, The 
World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Dean, J.M., M.E. Lovely, and H. Wang. 2005. “Are Foreign 
Investors Attracted to Weak Environmental Regulations? 
Evaluating the Evidence from China.” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 3505, The World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. 
Deepak, M.S., T. Spreen, and J. VanSickle, 1994. “An Analy-
sis of the Impact of a Ban on Methyl Bromide on the U.S. 
Winter Fresh Vegetable Market.” University of Florida, 
Gainesville. 
____. 1996. “An Analysis of the Impact of a Ban on Methyl 
Bromide on the U.S. Winter Fresh Vegetable Market.” 
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 28(2): 
433–443. 
EPA [see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency]. 
Ferguson, W., and A. Padula. 1994. “Economic Effects of 
Banning Methyl Bromide for Soil Fumigation.” Agricul-
tural Economics Report No. 677 (pp. 1–11), Economic Re-
search Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washing-
ton, D.C. 
Florida Agricultural Statistics Service. Various years. Florida 
Agricultural Statistics, Vegetable Summary. Florida Agri-
cultural Statistics Service, Tallahassee, FL. 
Georgia Agricultural Statistics Service. 1997. “Georgia Agri-
cultural Facts.” Georgia Agricultural Statistics Service, At-
lanta, GA. 
Lynch, L. 1996. “Agricultural Trade and Environmental Con-
cerns: Three Essays Exploring Pest Control Regulations 
and Environmental Issues.” Ph.D. dissertation, Department 
of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of 
California, Berkeley, CA. 
McCarl, B.A., and T.H. Spreen. 1980. “Price Endogenous 
Mathematical Programming Models as a Tool for Sector 
Analysis.”  American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
62(1): 87–102. 
Mexican Department of Agriculuture. Various years. “Anuario 
Estadistico de la Produccion Agricola de los Estados Uni-
dos Mexicanos.” Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia y 
Desarrollo Rural, Centro de Estadistica Agropecuaria. 
National Agricultural Statistics Service. Various years. “Agri-
cultural Prices Annual Summary.” National Agricultural 
Statistics Service, Washington, D.C. 
Nordstrom H., and W. Vaughan. 1999. Trade and the Envi-
ronment. World Trade Organization, Geneva, Switzerland. 
North Carolina Agricultural Statistics Service. Various years. 
“Vegetable Summary.” North Carolina Agricultural Statis-
tics Service, Raleigh, NC. 
Peters, M.A., and T.H. Spreen. 1989. “Price Endogenous 
Mathematical Programming Models and Integrability: An 
Alternative Approach.” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 71(5): 1342. 
Scott, S.W. 1991. “International Competition and Demand in 
the United States Fresh Winter Vegetable Industry.” Mas-
ter’s thesis, University of Florida, Gainesville. 
Sonoran Growers’ Association. Various years. Personal com-
munication. Sonora, Mexico. 
South Carolina Agricultural Statistics Service. Various years. 
Unpublished vegetable production statistics, South Carolina 
Agricultural Statistics Service, Columbia, SC. 
Spreen, T.H., J.J. VanSickle, A.E. Moseley, M.S. Deepak, and 
L. Mathers. 1995. “Use of Methyl Bromide and the Eco-
nomic Impact of Its Proposed Ban on the Florida Fresh 
Fruit and Vegetable Industry.” University of Florida Tech-
nical Bulletin No. 898, University of Florida, Gainesville. 
Sullivan, J. (ed.). 1994. “Environmental Policies: Implications 
for Agricultural Trade.” Agricultural Economic Report No. 
252 (June). Agriculture and Trade Analysis Division, Eco-
nomic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Washington, D.C. 
Sunding, D., C. Yarkin, D. Zilberman, J. Siebert, and A. Marco. 
1993. “Economic Impacts of Methyl Bromide Cancellation 
in California.” California Department of Food and Agricul-
ture, Sacramento, CA. 
Takayama, T., and G.G. Judge. 1971. Spatial and Temporal 
Price and Allocation Models. Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing Co. 
Texas Agricultural Statistics Service. Various years. “Vegeta-
ble Summary.” Texas Agricultural Statistics Service, Aus-
tin, TX. 
Urbach, F. 1990. “Ozone Depletion: Health and Environ-
mental Consequences.” Nature 344(6267): 598. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 1993. The Biologic and Eco-
nomic Assessment of Methyl Bromide.” National Agricul-
tural Pesticide Impact Assessment Program, U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 
____. 1997. Mexican import data provided by Ron Sponaugle, 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Riverdale, MD. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2002. “Methyl Bro-
mide Use Information.” Available online at http://www.epa. 
 74   April 2005  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
gov/ozone/mbr/background/index.html (accessed April 8, 
2005). 
VanSickle, J.J., E. Belibasis, D. Cantliffe, G. Thompson, and 
N. Oebker. 1994. “Competition in the U.S. Winter Fresh 
Vegetable Industry.” Agricultural Economics Report No. 
691, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agri-
culture, Washington, D.C. 
 
Wilson, P., G.D. Thompson, and R. Cook. 1997. “Mother-
Nature, Business Strategy, and Economics.” Choices (1st   
Quarter): 18–25. 
Willig, R.D. 1976. “Consumer Surplus without Apology.” 
American Economic Review 66(4): 589–597. 
Yarkin, C., D. Sunding, D. Zilberman, and J. Siebert. 1994. 
“All Crops Should Not Be Treated Equally.” California 
Agriculture 48 (May-June): 10–15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 